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INTRODUCTION 
In 1965, Northwestern University Law Review published Professor 
Marshall Shapo’s article, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape and the 
Frontiers Beyond.1 Professor Shapo’s paper analyzed the origins of 
constitutional tort law, which consists of suits for damages for constitutional 
violations committed by government officials or the governments 
themselves. The article began with an account of the post-Civil War 
background of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a statute enacted in 1871 to enforce the 
Fourteenth Amendment. After the Civil War, recalcitrant southerners, acting 
through groups like the Ku Klux Klan, intimidated the freedmen and their 
white supporters, organized lynch mobs, burned houses, and, in general, 
attempted to restore the old order. The statute authorizes a cause of action 
against “[e]very person” who, acting “under color of” state law, violates 
constitutional rights.2 Professor Shapo went on to recount the legislative 
history of § 1983 and the relevant case law over the next nine decades.3 
Interestingly, the Supreme Court rarely addressed § 1983 issues during 
that ninety-year period.4 Few cases were brought under the statute,5 and 
lower courts typically gave it a limited reach. When lower courts did 
consider § 1983 claims, they mainly read “under color of” as a requirement 
that the plaintiff show that state law authorized the violation, so that the 
availability of a state remedy would thwart the plaintiff’s effort to obtain 
access to federal court.6 Under this interpretation, the application of a statute 
that denies the right to vote to African Americans would be a § 1983 
violation, whereas police brutality that violates state law would not. 
The centerpiece of Professor Shapo’s article was the Supreme Court’s 
1961 ruling in Monroe v. Pape, in which the Court ruled that the lower 
courts’ interpretation of § 1983 was incorrect.7 The Court explained that 
“[t]he federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter 
need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked.”8 In 
 
 1 Marshall S. Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 NW. U. L. 
REV. 277 (1965). I will refer to this article as Constitutional Tort for the remainder of this Essay. 
 2 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
 3 See Shapo, supra note 1, at 279–319. 
 4 Wholly separate from § 1983, the Court developed a cause of action for prospective relief, 
stemming from Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, 
DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 927, 927 n.1 (7th ed. 2015). But damages were (and are) not available in Ex parte 
Young litigation. 
 5 See FALLON ET AL., supra note 4, at 986. 
 6 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 214, n.21 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 7 Id. at 168. 
 8 Id. at 183. 
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other words, the Court held that a § 1983 cause of action was available 
whether or not state law provided a remedy for the constitutional violation. 
This reading considerably enhanced the statute’s utility as a tool for 
enforcing constitutional rights, enabling courts to hold that official acts that 
violate state law, and for which state law provides a remedy, were also 
violations of the statute. Professor Shapo then described the case law that 
emerged in the first few years after Monroe.9 
In the decades after Constitutional Tort was published, the volume of 
§ 1983 litigation in the lower courts grew exponentially, the Supreme Court 
decided many more § 1983 cases, and § 1983 scholarship proliferated.10 
Much of the later judicial and scholarly work builds on Professor Shapo’s 
article, which warrants rereading even today. This brief Essay discusses three 
reasons why: (1) Professor Shapo’s focus on doctrine rather than theory; (2) 
his recognition of the important distinction between offensive and defensive 
constitutional remedies; and (3) his emphasis on the “tort” aspect of § 1983 
litigation. 
I. CONSTITUTIONAL TORT LAW 
In Monroe, the plaintiff claimed a violation of his Fourth Amendment 
rights; the Court’s holding could have been limited to such cases. But, 
instead, the Court’s holding is broadly stated, and it quickly became apparent 
that the § 1983 cause of action would not be limited to Fourth Amendment 
claims, as evidenced by Professor Shapo’s discussion in Constitutional 
Torts. His survey of the lower court cases showed that “the post-Monroe 
decisions have included at least a suggestion of a claim under each separate 
clause of the Bill of Rights,” except for the clauses concerned with “judicial 
mechanics.”11 He inferred, perhaps from the Court’s own language in 
Monroe—explaining that the statute “should be read against the background 
of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of 
his actions”12—that “what is developing is a kind of ‘constitutional tort.’ It 
is not quite a private tort, yet contains tort elements; it is not ‘constitutional 
law,’ but employs a constitutional test.”13 Professor Shapo went on to 
become a preeminent torts scholar, yet he never returned (in a sustained way) 
 
 9 Shapo, supra note 1, at 279–319. 
 10 See FALLON ET AL., supra note 4, at 987, 994–95. 
 11 Shapo, supra note 1, at 323. 
 12 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961). 
 13 Shapo, supra note 1, at 323–24. 
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to the “interesting amalgam”14 of tort and constitutional elements he 
identified in § 1983 litigation.15 
Nonetheless, his description of the § 1983 damages cause of action was 
prescient, for the Supreme Court has borrowed heavily from tort law in 
adjudicating § 1983 issues. It has said that § 1983 “creates a species of tort 
liability,”16 and it has identified the aims of constitutional tort as vindication 
of rights and deterrence of violations,17 goals that track the common law of 
torts.18 As for specific doctrines that mirror tort law, the Court has adopted a 
common law but–for test for cause in fact,19 and has curbed recovery for lack 
of proximate cause.20 Damages are measured by the common law 
“compensation principle,”21 and the test for punitive damages tracks the 
common law requirement of egregious misconduct.22 The qualified 
immunity doctrine has common law roots as well.23 
Some scholars deplore the Supreme Court’s “tort rhetoric.”24 In the 
leading article denouncing the role of tort terminology, Professor Sheldon 
Nahmod argues that “the Court, by using tort rhetoric, is attempting to 
marginalize § 1983 and to make it less protective of fourteenth amendment 
rights.”25 Professor Nahmod goes on to criticize, often with good reason, 
several Supreme Court cases that limit the scope of § 1983.26 But Professor 
Nahmod’s characterization of the Court’s references to tort as “rhetoric” 
already hints that the driving force behind the limits was not any tort concept. 
 
 14 Id. at 324. 
 15 It is important to note, however, that Professor Shapo’s later work in general tort law influenced 
scholarship on constitutional tort analogues. His book The Duty to Act helped to frame the constitutional 
tort affirmative duty analysis in Professors Eaton and Wells’s article Governmental Inaction as a 
Constitutional Tort: DeShaney and Its Aftermath. Thomas A. Eaton & Michael Wells, Governmental 
Inaction as a Constitutional Tort: DeShaney and Its Aftermath, 66 WASH. L. REV. 107, 108 n.6 (1991). 
 16 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976). 
 17 See, e.g., Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 139 (1988); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 223 (1988); 
Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307–10 (1986); Owen v. City of Independence, 
445 U.S. 622, 650–51 (1980). 
 18 See Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective 
Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1801 (1997). 
 19 See, e.g., Texas v. Lesage, 528 U.S. 18, 20–21 (1999) (per curiam); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. 
Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). 
 20 See Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285 (1980); see also County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 
137 S. Ct. 1539, 1548–49 (2017) (remanding for consideration of proximate cause). 
 21 Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 255, 257 (1978); Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist., 477 U.S. at 306–07. 
 22 See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 48–49 (1983). 
 23 See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967). 
 24 Sheldon Nahmod, Section 1983 Discourse: The Move from Constitution to Tort, 77 GEO. L.J. 
1719, 1719–20 (1989). 
 25 Id. at 1720. 
 26 Id. at 1725–31, 1738–51. 
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Instead, the Court may deploy tort rhetoric as window dressing for results on 
other grounds. In particular, the modern Supreme Court has tended to favor 
government over individual interests in § 1983 litigation, regardless of 
whether it uses tort rhetoric in its opinions. For example, it has rejected the 
tort concept of vicarious liability,27 and it has largely abandoned the tort law 
roots of qualified immunity.28 
The larger point is that, the Court’s rhetoric aside, tort concepts must, 
and should, inform the resolution of § 1983 issues. This is the insight 
reflected in Professor Shapo’s characterization of the area as an “amalgam” 
of constitutional and tort principles. A § 1983 suit for damages raises issues 
that closely resemble traditional common law tort issues.29 In both types of 
litigation, the breach of duty occurred in the past. In both, the breach may or 
may not be responsible for the plaintiff’s current harm, and some principle 
must be devised to determine whether it is or is not. In both, the amount of 
harm may be contested, and some principle must be devised to govern the 
resolution of the dispute. Finally, in both, the defendant may have acted with 
a greater or lesser degree of fault, and some principle must be chosen to 
determine how much fault is enough to trigger liability. 
The principles that govern the outcomes of ordinary tort cases should 
not be automatically applied to constitutional tort. But they are a starting 
point for an argument over whether and how to modify the principles to suit 
the needs of the constitutional tort context. In this sense, it is appropriate to 
decide § 1983 cases “against the background of tort liability.”30 
In practice, however, the Court has borrowed tort principles to suit its 
immediate purposes but has often neglected the distinctive issues that arise 
in the application of common law tort principles to § 1983. For example, in 
Carey v. Piphus31 and Memphis Community School District v. Stachura,32 the 
Court adopted the common law “compensation principle” as the measure of 
damages for constitutional torts. But the Court also recognized that common 
law tort rules of damages may not “provide a complete solution to the 
damages issue in every § 1983 case.”33 In this set of cases, “the interests 
protected by a particular constitutional right may not also be protected by an 
 
 27 See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978). 
 28 Compare Pierson, 386 U.S. at 555 (borrowing the common law “good faith” defense), with 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818–19 (1982) (abandoning the “good faith” prong of qualified 
immunity in favor of a strictly objective test). 
 29 See Michael Wells, Constitutional Remedies, Section 1983 and the Common Law, 68 MISS. L.J. 
157, 164–76 (1998). 
 30 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961). 
 31 435 U.S. 247, 255 (1978). 
 32 477 U.S. 299, 306 (1986). 
 33 Carey, 435 U.S. at 258. 
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analogous branch of the common law of torts.”34 In that event, “the task will 
be the more difficult one of adapting common-law rules of damages to 
provide fair compensation for injuries caused by the deprivation of a 
constitutional right.”35 It is a dismaying fact that, in the four decades since 
Carey, the Court has taken no steps to build on this insight. Its failure to do 
so is hardly compatible with the notion that the Court has a strong interest in 
the application of tort principles to constitutional tort law.36 Modern 
constitutional tort law would be more coherent, and more effective at 
vindicating rights and deterring violations, if the Court had paid more 
attention to the “interesting amalgam” Professor Shapo identified fifty-five 
years ago. 
II. OFFENSIVE VERSUS DEFENSIVE REMEDIES 
Once the Supreme Court read “under color of” broadly in Monroe, a 
whole new set of issues arose regarding what remedy a plaintiff may obtain 
upon proving a § 1983 violation. One of the lessons Professor Shapo draws 
from the post-Monroe cases is that the § 1983 cause of action is available to 
a broad range of constitutional violations that bear little resemblance to those 
committed by the Ku Klux Klan in the post-Civil War period.37 This Part will 
examine Professor Shapo’s categorization of offensive and defensive 
remedies and how, while some may argue for a less limited approach to 
damages, Professor Shapo was one of the first to identify remediation as an 
essential part of rights. His idea was one that would require a delicate balance 
between protecting rights and limiting the burden on the government. 
A recurring theme in the second half of Constitutional Tort is Professor 
Shapo’s recognition of the differences between offensive and defensive 
remedies. A defensive remedy is a shield against criminal or civil liability. 
For example, a bookseller charged with distributing obscene materials may 
attempt to raise the First Amendment as a defense. When the right-claimant 
becomes a plaintiff, he attempts to use the Constitution as a sword to obtain 
damages or prospective relief. For example, the bookseller may attempt to 
sue the police under § 1983 for damages for false arrest. Offensive remedies, 
in particular the damages remedy authorized by Monroe, will not necessarily 
 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 For some suggestions as to how common law tort doctrine may be adapted to the constitutional 
tort context, see Wells, supra note 29, at 196–222; Michael Wells, Constitutional Torts, Common Law 
Torts, and Due Process of Law, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 617, 618 (1997); and Eaton & Wells, supra note 
15, at 159–65. 
 37 See Shapo, supra note 1, at 320–26. 
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be available for every violation of a constitutional right.38 Commenting on 
Colon v. Grieco, a case in which a New Jersey District Court declined to 
allow the defendant to recover damages when he was detained for ten days 
without a charge,39 Professor Shapo notes that “the most provocative issue 
presented” in many post-Monroe cases relates to “the application of the 
statute as a sword in the context of [constitutional] provisions which 
principally have been interpreted as shields.”40 He pointed out “that a 
significant difference lies between overturning a criminal conviction because 
the defendant’s Bill of Rights guarantees have been violated (or overruling 
a defendant officer’s justification in a trespass action) and the affirmative 
grant of a civil action for damages.”41 And the criminal justice fact pattern 
illustrated by Colon is not unique. Later in the article, Professor Shapo 
returns to this point in discussing § 1983 litigation aimed at enforcing 
Fourteenth Amendment rights in other contexts.42 
Professor Shapo perceived a need for some restraint on liability in order 
to avoid “the development of a variety of federal common law without a 
correspondingly compelling federal interest.”43 Perhaps influenced by 
Justice Frankfurter’s federalism-based Monroe dissent,44 Professor Shapo 
recommended that “the federal judiciary should tread warily in utilizing a 
civil damage remedy against local law enforcement officers, where much 
that is vital to the case grows uniquely from the local situation.”45 He 
suggested a rule that recovery be limited to cases in which the defendant’s 
conduct was “outrageous.”46 
Reading the article fifty-five years after it was published, one may 
suggest that Professor Shapo was too quick to favor limits on the damages 
remedy. He could not have foreseen the increasing importance of the 
damages remedy as the Court expanded the scope of constitutional protection 
in the late 1960s and 1970s. For example, Pickering v. Board of Education 
held that government employees could not be dismissed for speech protected 
 
 38 Writing in 1965, Professor Shapo noted that few defenses had yet emerged. See id. at 324. The 
main defense is qualified immunity, which the Supreme Court recognized in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 
547 (1967). 
 39 See Shapo, supra note 1, at 302 & n.127 (discussing Colon v. Grieco, 226 F. Supp. 414 (D.N.J. 
1964)). 
 40 Id. at 303. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. at 322 (“Even given the broad language of the statute, it seems questionable that a breach of 
this constitutional shield must in all cases call forth the response of this statutory sword.”). 
 43 Id. at 326–27. 
 44 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 237–42 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 45 Shapo, supra note 1, at 325. 
 46 Id. at 327. 
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by the First Amendment.47 Estelle v. Gamble held that prisoners have an 
Eighth Amendment right to some level of medical attention.48 In Board of 
Regents v. Roth and its companion case, Perry v. Sindermann, the Court 
recognized that government employees may have “property” or “liberty” 
interests in their employment, and when they do, they cannot be dismissed 
without due process.49 Much of current constitutional tort litigation concerns 
efforts to enforce these guarantees. In all of these contexts, a damages 
remedy may be the only effective means of vindicating constitutional rights 
and deterring violations. Because the violation is in the past, it will not likely 
be repeated, and it is not linked to any ongoing legal process against the 
right-claimant.50 
The more important point is that, in distinguishing “sword” from 
“shield” remedies, Professor Shapo anticipated Professor Daryl Levinson’s 
critique of “rights essentialism” by several decades. Rights essentialism is 
the view that “rights can be talked about and understood—indeed, can be 
best understood—in complete isolation from (merely) remedial concerns.”51 
Following Professor Shapo’s lead, Professor Levinson goes on to reject the 
understanding of rights in favor of “remedial equilibration,” which holds that 
“[r]ights are dependent on remedies not just for their application to the real 
world, but for their scope, shape, and very existence.”52 Finally, drawing on 
Professor Levinson’s work, Professor Richard Fallon has articulated “the 
Equilibration Thesis,” which “holds that courts, and especially the Supreme 
Court, decide cases by seeking what they regard as an acceptable overall 
 
 47 391 U.S. 563, 574–75 (1968); see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 152 (1983) (holding that 
a public employee who speaks on a matter of public concern may nonetheless be fired if the disruption 
caused by the speech outweighs its value). 
 48 429 U.S. 97, 104–05 (1976); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994) (holding that 
prisoners have an Eighth Amendment right to be protected from attacks by other prisoners). 
 49 Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573, 577 (1972) (concluding that respondent had not shown 
he had a liberty or property interest in re-employment but describing circumstances in which such 
interests do exist); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599, 602 (1972) (finding that a teacher may have 
“property” or “liberty” interests in the decision as to the renewal of a teaching contract and remanding 
for a determination as to whether respondent had an “entitlement to job tenure” based on length of 
employment as a public college professor). 
 50 See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents 
of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 410 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment). It is important 
to distinguish between § 1983, on the one hand, and suits brought against federal officers under the federal 
common law remedy recognized in Bivens. The Court has severely restricted access to the latter remedy, 
most recently in Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 737 (2020) (denying a Bivens remedy for a cross-
border shooting). 
 51 Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 858 
(1999) (emphasis in original) (applying qualified immunity to federal officers). 
 52 Id. 
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alignment of doctrines involving justiciability, substantive rights, and 
available remedies.”53 
Professor Shapo also recognized that the link between rights and 
remedies has a normative aspect, which is why he suggested a requirement 
that “the defendant’s conduct be outrageous” in order for the plaintiff to 
obtain damages for constitutional violations.54 Two years after Professor 
Shapo’s article appeared, the Supreme Court adopted a different limit. In 
Pierson v. Ray, the Supreme Court held that police officers sued for Fourth 
Amendment violations for false arrest would have a defense based on “good 
faith and probable cause.”55 This case was the starting point for a “qualified 
immunity” doctrine, based partly on fairness to defendants and partly to limit 
the burden on government for damages litigation.56 Later cases applied this 
rule, or a version of it, to other officers, including a state governor,57 a cabinet 
officer,58 and school board members.59 Finally, in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the 
Court stated an across-the-board qualified immunity doctrine.60 Citing the 
“social costs” of constitutional tort litigation, Harlow held that 
“[g]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally are 
shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not 
violate clearly established . . . constitutional rights of which a reasonable 
person would have known.”61 Professor Fallon defends Harlow62 on the 
ground that “official immunity doctrines perform an equilibrating function 
by diminishing the social costs that constitutional rights would have if 
officers who violated them were always strictly liable in suits for damages.”63 
Professors Shapo, Levinson, and Fallon are on solid ground in 
recognizing the need for remedial equilibration. But one must distinguish 
between the question of whether such an equilibrating doctrine is appropriate 
and the question of what its content should be. In practice, the Court’s 
 
 53 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies—And Their Connections 
to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633, 637 (2006). 
 54 Shapo, supra note 1, at 327 (emphasis omitted). 
 55 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967). 
 56 See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1866 (2017); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813–14 
(1982); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319–20 (1975). 
 57 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247–48 (1974). 
 58 Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978). 
 59 Wood, 420 U.S. at 318. 
 60 457 U.S. at 821 (Brennan, J., concurring). This point was made explicitly by Justice Brennan. Id.; 
see, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Bidding Farewell to Constitutional Torts, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 933, 955–
56 (2019). 
 61 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. 
 62 See Fallon, supra note 60, at 975. 
 63 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Asking the Right Questions About Officer Immunity, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 
479, 485 (2011). 
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application of the “clearly established law” test has led it to rule that qualified 
immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly 
violate the law.”64 As such, while other analysts may favor even less 
protection for government officers65 than Professor Shapo’s proposal, his 
“abuse of power” proposal is more defendant-protective than the Court’s 
current test, where even a malicious official may escape liability “unless the 
right’s contours were sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the 
defendant’s shoes would have understood that he was violating it.”66 
Most significantly, at the dawn of constitutional tort Professor Shapo 
recognized the distinction between offensive and defensive remedies and 
laid the foundation for the understanding that rights are defined in part by 
their remedies. He understood the normative connection between rights and 
remedies and foresaw that the advent of a sword-like damages remedy would 
require some attention to the costs and the benefits of such broad remedies. 
III. THE CASE FOR DOCTRINAL SCHOLARSHIP 
While legal scholarship has trended toward the interdisciplinary, 
Constitutional Tort is an example of a purely doctrinal work whose 
contributions have stood the test of time. In this Part, I examine the shift from 
doctrinal to interdisciplinary scholarship and explain why Professor Shapo’s 
doctrinal scholarship defies the trend and serves as an indispensable resource 
to scholars and practitioners. 
Constitutional Tort focuses on the statute, its legislative history, and 
case law; it contains a bit of history, but no economics, no philosophy, no 
psychology, nor any other discipline external to law. It is a fine example of 
doctrinal scholarship, a style that used to dominate the law reviews, and is 
an enduring illustration of the value of the traditional approach. Doctrinal 
scholarship focuses on the content and application of cases, statutes, and 
administrative regulations. It draws on the text, background, and purposes of 
cases and enactments, traces their evolution over time, and examines the 
soundness of the strictly legal reasoning courts use to justify their rulings. 
Professor Shapo wrote Constitutional Tort before “the decline of law as an 
autonomous discipline,”67 a shift which, among other things, brought with it 
the rise of the field of interdisciplinary scholarship that now prevails. Judge 
 
 64 Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1867 (2017) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 65 See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99 VA. L. REV. 207, 209 
(2013) (favoring a negligence approach); Joanna C. Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, 
93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1797, 1800 (2018) (favoring abolition of qualified immunity). 
 66 Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1153 (2018) (citation omitted). 
 67 Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline:1962–1987, 100 HARV. L. 
REV. 761, 761 (1987). 
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Posner, an avatar of the new approach, contrasts the early 1960s, when “the 
lawyer’s traditional faith in the autonomy of his discipline seemed well 
founded,”68 with developments in the quarter-century that followed. For a 
variety of reasons,69 by the mid-1980s the conception of law as an 
autonomous discipline had been “dethroned.”70 In the thirty-odd years since 
Judge Posner’s essay, the trend he discerned has only grown more 
pronounced.71 Judge Posner appreciated, as we all do, the contributions other 
disciplines make to understanding and making law. 
Today no one advocates a return to the old days. For the reasons Judge 
Posner identified, there is a compelling case for bringing other perspectives 
to bear on legal problems.72 Though some proponents of the newer 
approaches would banish doctrinal scholarship or consign it to an inferior 
status,73 it does not follow that doctrinal scholarship lacks value. Every 
scholar, whatever the methodology, starts with a perspective from which to 
examine reality. The author necessarily excludes other angles from which 
the topic at hand may be studied in order to isolate the feature—economic, 
philosophical, historical, or otherwise74—that she wants to explore. The 
value of any scholarly work depends on whether the author’s project yields 
interesting insights otherwise inaccessible to the reader. Lessons from 
economics, philosophy, and history, among other disciplines, can provide 
valuable insights into law and legal institutions. But the benefits always 
come at a cost. Any framework is, after all, a frame, and necessarily 
sacrifices the insights available from looking at the topic from other angles. 
All of the external perspectives on law have in common the rejection of law 
 
 68 Id. at 764. 
 69 See id. at 766–77. Judge Posner discusses, among other things, “shattering of the political 
consensus,” “a boom in disciplines that are complementary to law, particularly economics and 
philosophy,” a collapse in “confidence in the ability of lawyers on their own to put right the major 
problems of the legal system,” a desire on the part of leading scholars “to be innovators rather than 
imitators,” “the continuing rise in the prestige and authority of scientific and other exact modes of 
inquiry,” and “the increasing importance of statutes and of the Constitution, compared to common law, 
as sources of law.” Id. at 767, 769, 772–73. 
 70 Id. at 761. 
 71 Lynn M. LoPucki, Dawn of the Discipline-Based Law Faculty, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 506, 506–07 
(2016) (documenting the growth of Ph.D.s on law faculties); James G. Milles, Leaky Boundaries and the 
Decline of the Autonomous Law School Library, 96 LAW LIBR. J. 387, 387 (2004). 
 72 See, e.g., Joanna C. Schwartz, Qualified Immunity’s Selection Effects, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 1101, 
1101 (2020). In this and other recent articles, Professor Schwartz relies on a massive empirical study to 
suggest radical reform of constitutional tort law. 
 73 See Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal 
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 34–35 (1992); David E. Van Zandt, The Relevance of Social Theory to 
Legal Theory, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 10, 24–25 (1989). 
 74 For convenience, I will refer to economists, historians, and philosophers as a shorthand for the 
whole array of interdisciplinary approaches to law. 
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as an autonomous discipline.75 Thus, all of them sacrifice the insights that 
come from the internal perspective. The internal perspective is the 
framework of doctrinal scholarship. It, too, creates a frame. Its shortcoming 
is that it cannot generate the knowledge that comes from any of the external 
approaches, but its strength is that it produces knowledge that none of the 
external approaches, even taken together, can generate. And the knowledge 
it produces is probably of more use to lawyers, judges, and students than 
most of what they will learn from other disciplines. 
A systematic problem with the perspective of the economist, the 
historian, the philosopher, and so on, is a tendency to exalt that perspective 
over all others. This tendency reflects a psychological phenomenon called 
“the law of the instrument,”76 which holds, in colloquial terms, that “if the 
only tool you have is a hammer . . . treat everything as if it were a nail.”77 A 
historian interested in law probably will not regard this as a problem when 
he studies or reads legal history because he cares only about the truths the 
historian can provide. The same is true of the economist or the philosopher. 
But the consumers of legal scholarship include lawyers, students, and judges. 
They may benefit from economic, historical, and philosophical analysis, but 
they will rarely be fully satisfied with it. In order to understand a judicial 
opinion, they need to know more than the historical context in which it arose, 
or the philosophical premises underlying it, or the economic implications of 
alternative approaches. They need to know more or less precisely what the 
earlier cases held and how the court reasoned from those holdings to the 
outcome here, or how the court distinguished the earlier cases. In order to 
evaluate the holding, they need to know the strong points and the weak points 
in the court’s reasoning, and they need some guidance as to whether there is 
room to argue the strength or weakness of any given point. Sometimes, the 
economist, the historian, or the philosopher can (and will choose to) help 
with this project. More often, it will be the doctrinal scholar, with his or her 
training in the “artificial reason” of the law,78 who provides guidance. Seen 
in this way, the distinctive contribution of traditional legal scholarship is that 
it does not bring some other discipline to bear on legal problems. 
Following the doctrinal model, Professor Shapo tells the lawyer, the 
judge, the law student, and even the interdisciplinary scholar, most of what 
 
 75 See generally Van Zandt, supra note 73 (discussing the ways in which legal theory may be 
considered a subset of social theory). 
 76 See ABRAHAM KAPLAN, THE CONDUCT OF INQUIRY: METHODOLOGY FOR BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 
28 (1964). 
 77 See ABRAHAM H. MASLOW, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SCIENCE: A RECONNAISSANCE 15–16 (1966). 
 78 The term is borrowed from Sir Edward Coke. See Prohibitions Del Roy, 6 Coke Rep. 280, 282 
(1608), quoted in Posner, supra note 67, at 762 n.1. 
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he or she needs to know about Monroe, its antecedents, and its early progeny. 
Anyone interested in learning about constitutional tort (including scholars 
from other disciplines) will benefit from spending some time with the paper. 
Bringing no external frame to the development of constitutional tort law, 
Professor Shapo uses the analytical and synthetic tools of a lawyer to 
examine the background of § 1983, its drafting, its use by courts over time, 
its revival in Monroe, and its post-Monroe development. For example, 
Professor Shapo’s discussion of statutory interpretation reflects the 
conventions of the time.79 It is not as theory-laden as the approaches 
developed in later decades by Professor William Eskridge,80 or Professors 
William Baude and Stephen Sachs.81 Precisely because he does not shape the 
evidence to fit a theory, Professor Shapo’s treatment of statutory 
interpretation complements other approaches. 
Professor Shapo’s research into the ninety-year history of the statute 
before Monroe is similarly helpful. His analysis of the cases decided during 
this period clarifies the issues and holdings,82 providing the background 
needed for anyone seeking to better understand the topic, rather than forcing 
the case law into a theoretical frame that may obscure as much as it would 
reveal. The latter half of the paper turns to the years after Monroe. In this 
section, Professor Shapo surveys and categorizes the “crazy quilt” of post-
Monroe lower court case law.83 His doctrinal approach makes the variety of 
lower court rulings available to any reader.84 His strictly legal analysis of the 
diverse approaches in the case law is accessible to lawyers, students, and 
judges wrestling with narrow legal issues from an internal perspective and 
 
 79 Professor Shapo does not cite any sources for his approach to statutory interpretation, Shapo, supra 
note 1, at 279–82, probably because it was the consensus view that statutes should be interpreted 
according to their purposes. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC 
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 148 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey 
eds., 1994); see also Posner, supra note 67, at 774–77 (discussing the pitfalls of certain modes of statutory 
interpretation). 
 80 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1483 
(1987) (arguing that interpretation of a statute should take into account changes in society and unforeseen 
circumstances). 
 81 See William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1079, 1082 
(2017) (arguing that statutory “interpretation . . . [is] governed by law”). 
 82 The line of Supreme Court cases between the enactment of § 1983 and Monroe includes Myers v. 
Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 
(1939); Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); United States v. Classic, 
313 U.S. 299 (1941); Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); 
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945). Professor Shapo describes this line of authority with 
economy and precision. See Shapo, supra note 1, at 282–87. This discussion is followed by an equally 
helpful examination of an array of lower court cases decided in the fifteen years before Monroe. See id. 
at 287–94. 
 83 See id. at 297. 
 84 See id. at 297–319. 
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to scholars from other disciplines armed with theories and looking for real-
world targets to which the theories may be applied. By contrast, a theorist 
would have selected one or two of these later cases to make a point about 
history, philosophy, economics, or some other external discipline. 
The value of a piece of scholarship depends on what it delivers, not on 
the methodology it employs. There is much to learn from doctrinal 
scholarship in general, and from Professor Shapo’s fifty-five-year-old article 
in particular. Even Judge Posner recognized that “[d]isinterested legal-
doctrinal analysis of the traditional kind remains the indispensable core of 
legal thought,” and lamented that “there is no surfeit of such analysis 
today.”85 Professor Shapo’s article is a perfect example of what Judge Posner 
was looking for, analysis that represents “the indispensable core of legal 
thought.”86 
CONCLUSION 
After writing Constitutional Tort, Professor Shapo moved on to other 
topics in tort law. Other parts of this festschrift are devoted to his work on 
products liability and many other areas. His insights on those topics are many 
and varied, and torts scholars have benefited from them greatly. I cannot help 
but to regret his decision to leave § 1983 to others, but Professor Shapo’s 
seminal article laid out the issues that would occupy constitutional tort 
scholars for over half a century. His work inspired me, as well as many 
others, to take an interest in the area. Throughout my career, I have benefitted 
greatly from his article, and from all of his books and articles over the whole 
range of tort law. I thank the Northwestern University Law Review for giving 
me the opportunity to comment on the enduring influence of Constitutional 
Tort. 
 
 85 Posner, supra note 67, at 777. 
 86 Id. 
